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1. Introduction 
Countries around the globe compete fiercely for foreign direct investment (FDI). Policy makers 
believe that FDI can contribute to a faster economic growth by bringing capital, technology and know-
how to developing countries. Recent empirical evidence suggests that FDI may also lead to positive 
productivity spillovers to local firms.1 Given these potential benefits of FDI inflows, an important 
question for policy makers in developing countries is how to attract foreign investors. 
 
Many governments believe that this can be achieved through investment promotion activities. The 
purpose of investment promotion is to reduce the costs of FDI by providing information on the host 
country, helping foreign investors cut through bureaucratic procedures, and offering fiscal or other 
incentives to international investors. Despite its importance for public policy choices, little is known 
about the effectiveness of investment promotion efforts. While the existing literature generally finds a 
positive relationship between investment promotion and FDI, most studies are hampered by a low 
number of observations, rely on cross-sectional data or focus solely on industrialized economies.2  
 
During the past two decades, developing countries began to actively engage in investment promotion 
and offer incentives to foreign investors. For instance, the 2005 Census of Investment Promotion 
Agencies (IPAs) revealed that 85 percent of the responding IPAs in developing countries were 
established in 1980 or later (see Figure 1). Moreover, 68 out of 81 developing countries reported 
offering financial, tax or other incentives to foreign investors. However, even if some earlier studies 
suggest that investment promotion appears to work in developed countries, it is unclear whether the 
same conclusion holds in a developing country context. On the one hand, investment promotion may 
be more important in the developing world where information is more difficult to access. On the other 
hand, it is possible that investment promotion may be ineffective due to deficiencies of the business 
environment or superfluous if low labor costs alone are powerful enough to attract foreign investors.  
 
This paper contributes to the existing literature on FDI promotion and FDI determinants in three ways. 
First, using a newly collected dataset, it shows that investment promotion activities lead to higher FDI 
inflows to developing countries. Before this data set became available, it was not possible to analyze 
                                                     
1 Recent empirical studies suggest that such spillover may primarily benefit industries supplying multinationals (for empirical 
evidence see Javorcik, 2004a, Blalock and Gertler, 2007, Javorcik and Spatareanu, 2007; for a literature review see Görg and 
Strobl, 2001, and Görg and Greenaway, 2004). 
2 See section 0 for the literature review. A related literature evaluates export promotion activities (e.g., Görg, Henry and 
Strobl, 2007, and Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton, 2006). 
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this question in a convincing manner in the context of developing countries. Second, the results 
suggest that the effectiveness of the investment promotion agency is affected by its legal status and its 
reporting structure. Besides having policy implications, obtaining intuitive results on these more 
nuanced questions gives us more confidence that the analysis captures the IPA effect rather than other 
factors. Third, our analysis provides evidence consistent with FDI incentives offered by other IPAs 
within a geographic region diverting FDI inflows. There is no indication of such competition among 
countries within the same income group but located in different geographic regions. 
Our analysis employs the data collected through a recent Census of Investment Promotion Agencies 
around the world. The Census contains information on investment promotion efforts in 109 countries, 
representing all income groups and geographic regions. About three quarter of responses pertain to 
developing countries. A unique feature of the Census is that it includes time-varying information on 
the existence of an IPA, its status and reporting structure, sector targeting and incentives offered to 
foreign investors.  
 
Our identification strategy relies on the fact that the majority of IPAs target particular sectors in their 
efforts to attract FDI. Sector targeting is considered to be best practice by investment promotion 
professionals (Loewendahl, 2001, Proksch, 2004). It also allows us to identify the effect of investment 
promotion using the difference-in-differences approach. We compare FDI inflows into targeted 
sectors, before and after targeting, to FDI inflows into non-targeted sectors, during the same time 
period.3 Our analysis is based on US FDI data, disaggregated by host country and sector and available 
for the period 1990-2004, provided by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. We control for changes 
in host country business environment by including country-year fixed effects, for heterogeneity of 
sectors in different locations by including country-sector fixed effects and for shocks to supply of FDI 
in particular sectors by adding sector-time fixed effects.  
 
Our results suggest that investment promotion efforts lead to higher FDI inflows to developing 
countries. We find that targeted sectors receive more than twice as much FDI as non-targeted sectors. 
This magnitude is plausible, given that many sectors receive small amounts of FDI in absolute terms. 
For instance, in 2004 the median sector-level inflow of US FDI to developing countries in our sample 
that received some US investment was 11 million dollars. Thus, the increase of 155 percent estimated 
in our analysis would translate into additional 17 million dollars of FDI.  
 
                                                     
3 Charlton and Davis (2006) use a similar identification strategy in their analysis of FDI inflows into OECD countries. 
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As sector targeting is a choice of the IPA, the targeting decision could be a response to earlier 
experience of the sector, which could present a reverse causality problem. However, when we exclude 
countries that reported in the Census that the targeting decision was based on the past success or 
failure in attracting FDI to the sector, our results hold. In addition, we find no evidence suggesting that 
targeting took place in sectors with relatively high or low inflows in the years preceding targeting.  
 
A series of robustness checks supports our conclusions. First, we show that the results hold if we 
exclude services sectors and utilities. This gives us confidence that our findings are not driven by 
simultaneous opening to FDI and targeting of services industries where entry of foreign investors was 
restricted in the past. Second, we demonstrate that controlling for the past stock of FDI does not affect 
the estimated coefficients. Third, to address the concern that FDI flows may be a poor reflection of 
actual activities of foreign investors (Lipsey, 2007), we demonstrate that our results hold if we use 
sales or employment of US affiliates abroad as our dependent variable. 
 
The significant positive effect of investment promotion found in the sector-level analysis is confirmed 
when we examine country-level data. The information on country-level FDI inflows comes from the 
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) and covers the 1972-2005 period. In this case, our 
variable of interest is the existence of an investment promotion agency, deduced from the 
establishment year reported by each agency. The magnitude of the effect is almost identical to that 
found in the sector-level exercise.  
As we are concerned about the potential endogeneity of IPA existence with respect to FDI inflows, we 
also use the instrumental variable approach. As our first instrument, we employ the existence of an 
export promotion agency (EPA) in the host country in the same year. We exploit the fact that while 
EPA activities are typically directed at domestic firms, IPAs and EPAs are often established at the 
same time. Our second instrument is the inflow of foreign aid into the host country which is justified 
on the grounds that multilateral and bilateral donors tend to co-finance establishment of IPAs and 
provide support to agencies. The instrumental variable approach confirms our earlier findings.  
 
In the country-level analysis, we also examine a more nuanced question: are certrain types of agencies 
more successful than others in attracting FDI? The existing case study evidence suggests that quasi-
government agencies tend to be more effective than subunits of ministries (Wells and Wint, 2000). 
Similarly, it is believed that agencies accountable to external entities are more effective than those 
accountable to a board. The fact that our findings are in line with these predictions gives us confidence 
that our results reflect the effect of investment promotion efforts rather than some other factors.  
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To confirm that we are not attributing general policy reforms to investment promotion, we examine 
the relationship between IPA existence and domestic capital formation. A general reform should affect 
both domestic investments and inflows of FDI, while investment promotion should only affect inflows 
of FDI. We find that IPA existence has no effect on domestic investment. This result is robust across a 
series of specifications, both with and without controls for inflows of FDI.  
 
We then turn our attention to an aspect of investment promotion that receives considerable attention 
from both policy makers and academics, namely FDI incentives. We use time-varying information on 
the existence of five different types of incentives. These are: financial incentives, tax holidays, 
reduced tax rates, subsidized infrastructure or services, and regulatory concessions. Unfortunately, due 
to a high correlation between the existence of an IPA and the use of incentives, it is difficult to 
distinguish between the two effects. When the existence of investment promotion agency and 
incentives are included simultaneously, the IPA variable is significant while the incentive variable is 
not. When the investment promotion variable is excluded, we find statistically significant positive 
coefficients on tax incentives and subsidized infrastructure or services. The magnitude of the effect is 
about the same as what we typically find for investment promotion.  
 
Last we focus on the concern of government officials that policies in competing countries might divert 
FDI inflows. We test this hypothesis by including the number of competing countries that have an 
investment promotion agency and the number of competing countries that make use of investment 
incentives in the same time period. We find that competitors’ general investment promotion efforts, as 
proxied by the existence of an IPA, do not lead to diversion of FDI. However, the competitors’ 
investment incentives negatively affect FDI inflows. This suggests that incentives work differently 
from general investment promotion efforts. The evidence of competition effects is present only when 
competitors are defined as other countries in the same geographic region, but not when they are 
defined as other countries at the same income level. The evidence of competition for FDI taking place 
at the regional level is consistent with practitioners’ insight that potential foreign investors first choose 
a target region, and then choose a country within that region as their investment destination (Bjorvatn 
and Eckel, 2006).4  
 
Our results have several policy implications. First, they suggest that investment promotion may be a 
viable policy option for developing countries which wish to attract FDI inflows. Second, our results 
                                                     
4 Charlton (2003) reviews case studies on competition in incentives and finds it to be the strongest between close neighbors 
with similar economic conditions and factor endowments. 
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confirm the practitioners’ view that subunits of ministries tend to be less effective in attracting FDI 
than agencies with a more autonomous status and that accountability to an external entity positively 
affect agencies’ performance. Third, our findings on the diverting effect of tax incentives offered by 
other countries in the sane geographic region point to potential benefits of regional coordination in this 
area.  
 
This study is structured as follows. Section 0 discusses the role of investment promotion and places 
the study in the context of the existing literature. Section 0 describes the empirical strategy and the 
data employed. Section 0 presents the results, while section 0 concludes.  
2. Literature review 
2.1. What is investment promotion? 
Wells and Wint (2000) define investment promotion as activities through which governments aim to 
attract FDI inflows. These activities encompass: advertising, investment seminars and missions, 
participation in trade shows and exhibitions, distribution of literature, one-to-one direct marketing 
efforts, facilitating visits of prospective investors, matching prospective investors with local partners, 
help with obtaining permits and approvals, preparing project proposals, conducting feasibility studies 
and servicing investors whose projects have already become operational. Their definition of promotion 
excludes granting incentives to foreign investors, screening potential investment projects and 
negotiations with foreign investors, even though some IPAs may also be engaged in such activities. 
 
Investment promotion activities can be grouped into four areas: (i) national image building, (ii) 
investment generation, (iii) investor servicing, and (iv) policy advocacy. Image building activities aim 
to build a perception of the country as an attractive location for foreign direct investment. Investment 
generation involves identifying potential investors who may be interested in establishing a presence in 
the country, developing a strategy to contact them and starting a dialogue with the purpose of having 
them commit to an investment project. Investor servicing involves assisting committed investors in 
analyzing business opportunities, establishing a business and maintaining it. Policy advocacy 
encompasses initiatives aiming to improve the quality of the investment climate and identifying the 
views of private sector in this area (Wells and Wint, 2000).  
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2.2. How can investment promotion affect the decision process of a potential in-
vestor?5 
A company that has decided to engage in FDI usually starts the process of selecting the investment 
location by drawing a long list of potential host countries. The list is put together by the company 
executives or by a consulting firm hired for the purpose of site selection. The long list typically 
includes 8 to 20 countries which can be thought of as belonging to three groups: (i) most popular FDI 
destinations in the world, (ii) countries close to the existing operations of the investor, and (iii) 
emerging FDI destinations (that is, countries that the investor may not be initially very serious about 
but which represent “out of the box” thinking). The inclusion of the third category presents an 
opportunity for IPAs. The potential investor or the consulting firm working on its behalf is likely to 
include in the third group countries whose advertisements they have recently seen in international 
media, countries whose IPAs have recently approached them or their colleagues, or countries whose 
IPA representatives they have met at conferences and industry fairs.6  
 
Based on the trade-off between costs and the quality of business environment, the long list is narrowed 
down to a short list of up to 5 potential host countries. This is usually done without visiting the 
potential host countries, so the accessibility of the information about the business conditions in a host 
country plays a crucial role. IPAs that provide up-to-date, detailed and accurate data on their websites 
and IPAs that are willing to spend time preparing detailed answers to investors’ inquiries and 
customize these answers to the needs of an individual investor can increase the chances of their 
countries being included in the short list.  
 
The next step in the decision-making process involves visiting the countries included in the short list. 
This can be done by the potential investor, consultants or both. Multiple sites in each country may be 
visited. A visit often involves interactions with an IPA which has the opportunity to emphasize the 
advantages of locating in its country, answer questions, show executives potential investment sites or 
introduce them to potential local business partners.  
 
In the final stage of the process, the foreign investor chooses an investment location based on the 
availability of potential sites, costs, the overall quality of business climate and availability of 
                                                     
5 This subsection draws on MIGA (2006) and the authors’ interviews with former professional consultants assisting 
companies in establishing facilities abroad. 
6 For instance, the Polish IPA believes that TV advertising spots increased the number of visitors to its website by 43 percent 
in 2006 (source: Dziennik online. “Wielka promocja rozpoczeta. Polska jak proszek do prania” December 29, 2006.  
http://www.dziennik.pl/Default.aspx?TabId=97&ShowArticleId=26406). 
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incentives. An IPA can assist in providing information on incentives and offering help with the 
registration process.  
 
As evident from the above outline, IPAs can play a significant role in the selection process of FDI 
sites. The national IPA is often the first entity which a potential investor contacts to obtain 
information. Absence of an IPA not only increases the investor’s cost of gathering information but 
also sends a negative signal suggesting that the country is not interested in attracting FDI. It may 
constitute a reason to eliminate a location during the selection process. 
2.3. Rationale for public support of investment promotion 
The theoretical justification for public support for investment promotion is based on a market failure. 
Potential foreign investors must incur a cost to gather information about potential returns available in 
alternative investment locations. This cost may be higher in a developing country context where 
published statistics and other information sources are scarce. As argued by Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1986), markets for information are fundamentally different from other markets, and in the presence of 
imperfect information they may not produce Pareto efficient outcomes. The information cost may also 
be increased by local firms and other foreign investors operating in the location who may have an 
incentive to restrict information flows in order to prevent the entry of potential competitors. By 
disseminating information about potential investment opportunities, an IPA can enhance the 
availability of information to potential foreign investors and facilitate more efficient capital allocation. 
 
The second reason governments may want to subsidize investment promotion is due to positive 
externalities associated with FDI inflows. There is a large literature arguing that foreign direct 
investment may result in knowledge spillovers to the domestic industry. As foreign investors do not 
take into account this externality when making their decisions, they will provide less than the socially 
optimal level of FDI. Public intervention is then needed to increase the amount of investment to the 
socially optimal level.7 
2.4. Existing literature on effectiveness of investment promotion 
Despite widespread implementation of investment promotion around the world, little is known about 
how effective these policies are. Pioneering work by Wells and Wint (2000), based on case studies and 
a very limited econometric analysis, found a positive correlation between investment promotion and 
the level of FDI per capita. Subsequent work by Morisset and Andrews-Johnson (2004) also 
                                                     
7 For a detailed discussion of reasons why countries may choose to subsidize FDI see Hanson (2001). 
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concluded that IPAs appear to play a useful role in attracting FDI. However, both studies were based 
on cross-sectional data and a very small number of observations (between 36 and 58).  
 
Contributions studying FDI inflows into the US have relied on more detailed data and employed a 
more rigorous methodology. Head, Ries and Swenson (1999) estimated a location choice model on a 
sample of 760 Japanese manufacturing establishments in the US between 1980 and 1992. In addition 
to agglomeration factors and other controls, the authors examined the effects of profit taxes, factor 
subsidies, the existence of a foreign trade zone in the state, the use of unitary taxation by the state, and 
the presence of an investment promotion office in Japan. They did not find a significant effect of 
investment promotion offices in Japan. Bobonis and Shatz (2007) analyzed determinants of the FDI 
stock in US states from eight source countries using Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimator. 
They measured investment promotion with the number of years a state had a full-time state trade or 
investment office in each of the eight countries. They found that a one-percent increase in the number 
of years with an investment office increased the FDI stock by between 0.14 and 0.27 percent. In their 
sample, the latter figure corresponded to a one million USD (at the median) or a 2.6 million USD (at 
the mean) increase in the value of the FDI stock.8  
 
The most rigorous analysis to date performed in a multi-country setting was done by Charlton and 
Davis (2006). The authors focused on the question of whether IPAs have been more successful in 
attracting FDI inflows into industries they explicitly target. Industry-level data on FDI inflows into 19 
industries in 22 OECD countries during the 1990-2001 period combined with information on targeted 
industries collected through a survey of IPAs provided the basis for their study. Using propensity score 
matching and the difference-in-differences specification, the authors found that targeting of an 
industry increased the growth rate of FDI inflows into that industry by 41 percent.  
 
This study extends the existing literature in several directions. First, it applies a rigorous approach, 
similar to that pioneered by Charlton and Davis (2006), to a large sample of developed and developing 
countries. As mentioned before, little is known about the effectiveness of investment promotion in 
developing countries. One could argue that investment promotion could be more effective in the 
developing world due to scarcity of detailed information on the prevailing business conditions, rules 
and regulations and due to high costs of gathering such information. Alternatively, one can argue that 
in developing countries lacking a “good product to market” (i.e. good business climate), investment 
                                                     
8 The literature on location determinants of FDI in the US goes back to at least the 1980s. See Bobonis and Shatz (2007) and 
Coughlin and Segev (2000) for a review.  
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promotion efforts may be a waste of resources, while in developing countries with an acceptable 
business environment low labor costs may be attracting FDI inflows even in the absence of investment 
promotion. Second, this study examines whether the status and the reporting structure of investment 
promotion agencies matter for their effectiveness. Third, our analysis goes beyond the existing 
literature by examining the effect of regional competition in FDI incentives.     
3. Empirical strategy and data 
3.1. Empirical strategy 
Our empirical analysis will rely on two datasets: (i) country-sector panel data and (ii) aggregate 
country-level panel data. The basic empirical specification in the sector-level analysis is 
 
 
The dependent variable is the log of inflow of foreign direct investment into sector i in country c at 
time t. Sector_targetedcit equals one if country c targets sector i at time t and zero otherwise. γci, γct and 
γit are country-industry, country-time and industry-year fixed effects, respectively.  
 
The question of interest is whether targeted sectors receive higher FDI inflows in the post targeting 
period (relative to pre-targeting period and non-targeted sectors). Note that time-invariant 
characteristics that differentiate sectors chosen for targeting from other sectors will be captured by 
country-sector fixed effects. Shocks common to all sectors in a particular country in a particular year 
will be captured by country-year fixed effects. Shocks affecting supply of FDI in a particular sector 
will be controlled for by sector-year fixed effects. The model will be estimated on a sample of 
countries that have or have not practiced sector targeting. Narrowing the sample to only countries 
engaged in targeting does not change the conclusions of the study.     
 
In the aggregate analysis, we will estimate the following model: 
 
 
where the dependent variable is the log of aggregate inflow of foreign direct investment into country c 
at time t. IPAct equals one if country c had an investment promotion agency at time t and zero 
otherwise. ψc and ψt are country and year fixed effects, respectively. Xct includes time-varying country 
controls. All variables and their sources are described in section 0.  
cititctcicitcit getedSector_tarFDIflow εγγγβα +++++= 11ln
cttcctctct XIPAFDIflow ςψψθβα +++++= 22ln
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3.2. Econometric issues 
Identifying the relationship between investment promotion efforts and FDI inflows poses several 
challenges. Perhaps the most important challenge is establishing the direction of causality. It could be 
argued that the choice of sectors to be targeted is endogenous; IPAs could be targeting sectors which 
already experienced high inflows. In our sector-level analysis, which compares FDI inflows to 
targeted and non-targeted sectors pre- and post-targeting, we use four different strategies to deal with 
the potential reverse causality. First, we include country-industry fixed effects, which take out 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics specific to country-industry combinations. If, for example, 
the mining sector in South Africa was chosen for targeting because of the endowment of gold and this 
endowment is also the reason for large FDI inflows into the sector, this is controlled for by the 
country-sector fixed effect. Second, we show that our results are robust to a specification with first, 
second and third lags. A change in FDI inflows is unlikely to explain a change in policy which 
precedes it, although the strategy is not robust to forward looking behavior of policy makers. Third, 
we investigate if the sectors targeted were different from other sectors in the years before the targeting 
started. We find no evidence of relatively successful or unsuccessful sectors being chosen for 
targeting. Fourth, as IPAs were asked in the Census about the reasons behind targeting a particular set 
of sectors, we show that the results hold even if we exclude targeted sectors in countries that made 
targeting decisions based on the past success or failure in attracting FDI to that sector.  
 
The measures described above do not address the theoretical possibility that IPAs know which sectors 
will attract a lot of FDI in the future and choose to target them to show results. In the Census, IPAs 
were asked about who decided which sectors to target.9 The incentive to target sectors that already 
have high expected FDI inflows may have been present at the agency board level, but it is harder to 
make the same case for the other entities. Of the 97 agencies that responded, only 6 said the decision 
was entirely left to the agency board, 24 reported the board having some input into the decision, and 
67 said the agency board was not at all involved in the decision. Since the majority of the countries in 
the sample responded that the agency board was not involved in the choice of sectors, we do not view 
this possibility as a cause for concern.  
 
 
 
                                                     
9 The entities involved in the decision were: president’s office, prime minister’s office, ministry of foreign affairs, ministry of 
finance, ministry of industry, ministry of commerce, agency board or the decision was based on a national strategy plan. In 
some cases, several entities were involved.  
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In the analysis based on aggregate data, where we use the existence of an IPA as our investment 
promotion variable, we follow three approaches to deal with the potential reverse causality problem. 
The first approach is to attenuate the problem by including country fixed effects and lagging the IPA 
indicator by one or more periods. The second approach is instrumental variables estimation, where 
information on the existence of an export promotion agency and the amount of foreign aid are used as 
instruments. The third approach is to ask more nuanced questions such as: do IPA’s independence and 
reporting structure matter for its effectiveness in attracting FDI? As it is not clear why the amount of 
FDI inflows should affect the type of an agency being created or a change in the agency status or 
reporting structure, these results give us more confidence that the causality goes from investment 
promotion to inflows and not the other way around, especially because the findings are consistent with 
the conclusions of the case study literature.  
 
The second challenge in our analysis is to distinguish the effect of an IPA from other changes in policies 
(or anything else relevant for FDI inflows) occurring at the same time. In the sector-level analysis, we 
address this challenge by including country-year fixed effects which capture country-specific factors that 
may influence FDI inflows at a particular point in time. For instance, if country c started special 
investment promotion efforts in the automotive sector in year t and at the same time simplified 
registration procedures for foreign investors, to the extent that the latter reform affected all sectors 
equally, it would be captured by the country-year fixed effect. We also include sector-time fixed effects 
to capture factors affecting worldwide supply of FDI in a particular sector at a particular point in time. 
These fixed effects capture global unobserved sector-specific shocks. For example, if international 
investors suddenly decided to increase investments in the ICT sector, and a country at the same time 
started targeting the ICT sector, the investment promotion variable could capture the global shock rather 
than the country’s promotion efforts. Inclusion of sector-year fixed effects takes care of this possibility. 
 
In the country-level analysis, we include controls for various aspects of the business climate in the 
host country and other typical FDI determinants used in the literature. We also show that the existence 
of an IPA does not affect domestic investment. As most policy changes would tend to influence both 
domestic and foreign investment, this gives us more confidence in our results.  
 
The third challenge is to distinguish between general investment promotion (information provision, 
image building, help with red tape etc.) and tax incentives. There is a high correlation between IPA 
existence and tax incentives, which unfortunately prevents us from separating the two effects with 
confidence. 
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3.3. Data 
Our data on investment promotion activities comes from the 2005 Census conducted by the World 
Bank’s Research Department in cooperation with the Foreign Investment Advisory Services, the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the World Association of Investment Promotion 
Agencies. An electronic survey was sent out to all national investment promotion agencies around the 
world. After several weeks reminder e-mails were sent out, and after some more weeks phone calls 
were made to increase the likelihood of response. As the survey forms came in, the data were carefully 
checked for inconsistencies and missing information. Then new rounds of phone calls were made to 
clarify inconsistencies and complete the data. The survey was sent out in December 2005, and by 
April 2006 most of the information was complete. The survey form gave uniformity needed for 
comparison across countries, while the information collected through the phone calls provided 
guidance on interpretation of the responses. This comprehensive process yielded responses from 109 
national investment promotion agencies. Additionally, we found detailed information on the activities 
of the Austrian IPA, which did not respond to the Census, on its website. The sample covers countries 
across all geographic regions as well as all income levels. Eighty-one of the responses received were 
from developing countries. The sample also includes additional 31 countries that we regard as very 
likely to not have an investment promotion agency. These were identified by their absence in different 
directories of IPAs, lack of websites, by confirmation of national embassies/other national public 
institutions or by consultations with World Bank country economists.10  
 
A potential concern is that high quality agencies are overrepresented in the sample due to self-
selection. We cannot rule out this possibility completely, but a glance at our sample reveals a wide 
representation of countries across all income groups and regions. Also our experience from collecting 
the data suggests the opposite. Some developed countries were among the hardest to obtain answers 
from, while countries in, for example, Sub Saharan Africa were often extremely helpful in providing 
as extensive and precise information as possible. One explanation could be the opportunity cost; 
officers of IPAs in developed countries often appeared to be more busy and harder to contact. 
Therefore, it is not clear which way a potential sample bias would work. If anything, it could make 
investment promotion appear less efficient than it actually is.   
 
In the design of the survey, special attention was given to collecting time-varying information. While 
this increased the effort needed to collect the data, it also allowed for the use of panel estimation 
techniques and made it possible to control for time-invariant country-specific unobservable factors. 
                                                     
10 The actual number of countries included in the empirical analysis depends on the availability of other variables included. 
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Attention was also given to sector-specific time-varying measures of investment promotion The 
agencies were asked if they targeted specific sectors and when targeting started and ended. 
 
The Census also included questions on more subtle characteristics of the agencies. For instance, IPAs 
were asked about their legal status (sub-unit of ministry, autonomous public body, semi-autonomous 
agency reporting to a ministry, joint public-private entity, private entity), and if the status had 
changed, when the change happened and what the status was before the change. Additionally the 
Census included a question asking to whom the agency was accountable and how long they had been 
reporting to the overseeing entity.  
 
Investment incentives were another aspect of investment promotion covered in the Census. Despite the 
attention received by investment incentives, to the best of our knowledge, a database with broad cross-
country and cross-time coverage of investment incentives offered does not exist. Collection of such 
data in itself represents a contribution to the FDI literature.  
 
Parallel to the survey on investment promotion, Lederman, Olarreaga and Payton (2006) collected 
information on export promotion agencies. Data on the date of establishment of an export promotion 
agency are used in our study as an instrument for the existence of an investment promotion agency in a 
country, since establishment of these two types of agencies have often been a part of a more active 
internationalization strategy of governments. At the same time, the exclusion restriction, that the 
existence of an export promotion agency should not be included directly in the equation explaining 
FDI inflows, should be fulfilled, since export promotion agencies primarily help domestic firms.   
 
FDI data for the sector-level analysis are supplied by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
These data give the stocks of US FDI abroad.11 We use the first difference of the stocks to calculate 
flows. BEA publishes information on 13 sectors until 1998 and 15 sectors from 1999.12 We made two 
changes to the BEA data. We aggregated “Other manufacturing” and “Other industries” into one 
sector in the pre-1999 data, and “Machinery” and “Computer and electronic products” into one sector 
in the post-1998 data. The second change was to match sectors over time. Due to a break in the 
                                                     
11 U.S. direct investment abroad is defined as the ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one US resident of 10 
percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated foreign business enterprise or the equivalent interest in an 
unincorporated foreign business enterprise. The data capture the cumulative value of parents' investments in their affiliates 
(source: http://www.bea.gov/bea/ai/0395iid/maintext.htm). Data points suppressed by the BEA for confidentiality reasons are 
treated as missing. Data points reported as values belonging to the range between -500,000 and 500,000 US dollars are 
treated as equal to 500,000 dollars. We interpolated missing information on stocks to increase the number of observations.   
12 From 1999, the BEA-data are classified under the 1997 North American Industry Classification System (NAICS).  
Previously, data were classified under the Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC). 
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aggregation in 1998 in the BEA data, sector definitions are not exactly the same during the entire 
period (1989-2004). As our identification strategy is to follow sectors over time and test if post-
targeting inflows are significantly higher than pre-targeting inflows (and inflows to non-targeted 
sectors), we would like to have long time periods before and after targeting. As the break in 
aggregation appeared around the middle of the period, we would typically have either very few years 
pre-targeting or very few years post-targeting had we not implemented the matching procedure.  
 
After these two changes, we match BEA sectors to the sector classification used in the Census to 
collect targeting information. See Table 1 for the concordance and Figure 2 for summary statistics on 
sectors that are most frequently targeted. We have a maximum of 15 sectors per country. The stock 
data are available from 1989-2004 (first differenced for 1990-2004). Table 2 shows the 124 countries 
included in the sector sample.13 For additional statistics on the sectors see Table 3 and Table 4. 
 
The US is one of the top FDI source countries, so by focusing on US FDI we capture a large share of 
the world’s FDI stock. Figure 3, which compares the stock of US FDI to the stock of FDI from other 
OECD countries in 2000, demonstrates that US was the dominant source country in Latin America, 
East Asia and industrialized economies. Additional advantages of using the BEA data are their 
comparability across countries and access to figures on sales and employment of US affiliates abroad. 
We use the latter figures in our robustness checks.  
 
In the aggregate analysis, flow data from the IMF International Financial Statistics are used. The IMF 
data capture inflows of FDI to each country from any country in the world. The aggregate analysis 
covers the period 1972-2005. Table 2 and its footnotes lists the 128 countries that are included in the 
aggregate analysis.14 
 
In both the analysis based on BEA sector data and in the analysis based on IFS aggregate data we use 
the log of FDI inflows as our dependent variable. To deal with zeros we add one US dollar to all  
 
 
                                                     
13 The number of 124 countries corresponds to the baseline specification in Table 9. 
14 The number of years differs across countries, and the number of observations differs across econometric specifications due 
to the availability of control variables. The figure of 128 refers to relevant countries (countries from which we got a response, 
for which IPA existence could not be confirmed, or for which we know that they do not have an IPA) with FDI data in IFS.     
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observations before taking logs. To deal with negative values we follow Blonigen (2004) and 
Eichengreen and Tong (2005) and set all negative values to 0.1 US dollar before taking logs.15 
 
We follow the literature on FDI determinants (e.g. Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Javorcik, 2004b) and 
control for market size, labor costs, macroeconomic stability and business climate. Purchasing power 
of local consumers is measured as the log of GDP per capita. This variable could also be interpreted as 
a proxy for labor costs; thus the expected sign on the coefficient could be either positive or negative. 
Market-seeking FDI would be attracted to countries with high purchasing power, while FDI with the 
intention of cutting production costs is more likely to flow to countries with lower wage cost. GDP 
growth and the log of population size are proxies for the potential market size, and a positive 
coefficient is expected on these variables. The GDP and population variables are from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI).16 The inflation rate, provided by the IMF International 
Financial Statistics, is a proxy for macroeconomic stability. High inflation indicates an unstable 
macroeconomic environment and thus we expect a negative coefficient. As measures of political 
institutions and business climate we use an index of civil liberties from Freedom House (available 
from 1972-2004).17 It ranges from one denoting the most free countries to seven denoting the least free 
countries. A negative coefficient is, therefore, expected. The political risk rating provided by the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), available for 1984-2006, is also used.18 A positive 
coefficient is anticipated since the variable ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 means very high political 
risk and 100 very low political risk.  
 
In some specifications, we use gross capital formation or gross fixed capital formation as the 
dependent variable. Both variables come from IMF’s International Financial Statistics. In the 
instrumental variable approach, we use information on aid inflows per capita (in current US dollars) 
and official development assistance and official aid (in current US dollars), both from the WDI. The 
summary statistics are presented in Table 5 – 8. 
                                                     
15 As we were concerned about a significant number of cases with zero investment, we also used the Tobit specification 
including regional rather than country fixed effects. The Tobit results confirmed our findings. This was true both when the 
lower censoring limit for the dependent variable was set to log(1) and log(0.1), which corresponds to zero and negative FDI 
inflows, respectively. As a robustness check in the sector-level data, we also estimated the models from Table 9 without 
distinguishing between zeros and negative FDI flow values (i.e. we set both zero and negative values to 0.1 before taking 
logs). The effect of targeting was significant at the 1% level for all the specifications in the developing country sample (the 
coefficient varied between 1.018 and 1.454).         
16 http://publications.worldbank.org/WDI/  
17 http://www.freedomhouse.org/. The results are also robust to using political rights from Freedom house.  
18 http://www.icrgonline.com/  
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4. Results 
4.1. Sector-level analysis  
We start our investigation of the effectiveness of investment promotion efforts with a sector-level 
analysis. Our identification strategy relies on the fact that most IPAs focus their efforts on a certain 
number of priority (target) sectors.19 Sector targeting is viewed by investment promotion practitioners 
as best practice as it is believed that more intense efforts concentrated on a few priority sectors are 
likely to lead to greater FDI inflows than less intense across-the-board attempts to attract FDI. 
Targeting means engaging in the standard investment promotion activities, such as image building, 
investment generation, investor servicing and policy advocacy (see subsections 2.1 and 2.2), but 
applying them to a selection of industries rather than to foreign investors in general. Thus, an IPA not 
engaged in targeting will promote its country as a good place to do business, while an IPA targeting 
particular sectors will emphasize why its country is an ideal location for investors operating in these 
industries. Similarly, the former IPA will attend many different types of fairs and conferences while 
the latter will present only at events specific to the industries it aims to attract. The idea behind 
targeting is that a more focused message tailored and delivered to a narrow audience will be more 
effective than general investment promotion activities. 
 
Taking advantage of information on sectors targeted by IPAs (if any), we use the difference-in-
differences approach and examine whether sectors targeted by IPA receive more FDI inflows in the 
post-targeting period relative to the pre-targeting period and non-targeted sectors. Our goal is not to 
check whether countries with IPAs engaged in sector targeting receive more FDI than countries that 
do not follow this approach. Rather, targeting is used as a convenient identification strategy that 
allows us to ask whether IPAs are successful at bringing the type of FDI they are meant to attract.  
 
The estimated specification includes a set of controls. To take into account heterogeneity across 
sector-country combinations, we include sector-country fixed effects. Rather than including explicit 
country-level controls, we include in the specification country-year fixed effects. These control for all 
country-specific changes taking place over time. To the extent that changes in the host country 
policies, regulations and other factors affect FDI inflows to all sectors in the same way, country-year 
fixed effects will capture them. It is also possible that some global shocks affect the supply of FDI in a 
                                                     
19 86 IPAs, out of the 104 responding to the question on sector targeting, answered that they were using sector targeting or 
had done so in the past. Of these, 56 gave complete timing of the targeting efforts towards at least one sector and we were 
able to include these targeted sectors in the sample. We did not include in the sample targeted sectors for which we did not 
have complete timing.  
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particular sector. To take this into account, we add sector-year fixed effects. To the extent global 
shocks affect flows of FDI into a particular sector in the same way across countries, they will be 
captured by sector-year fixed effects. 
 
The results, presented in Table 9, suggest that investment promotion efforts are associated with higher 
FDI inflows to developing countries. The coefficient on the dummy for a sector being targeted is 
positive and statistically significant in the developing country subsample. In the full sample, 
contemporaneous targeting does not appear to matter. In the post-targeting period, targeted sectors in 
developing countries appear to receive 155% higher FDI inflows (column 5). This effect is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
 
While the magnitude of the effect may seem large, it is not implausible. Many sectors experience zero 
and close to zero inflows, and if we consider only positive flows of US FDI, the median 2004 value is 
21 and 11 million dollars in the full and the developing country sample, respectively. Thus, the 
estimated 155% percent increase would mean an additional annual inflow of 17 million dollars for the 
median sector-country observation in the developing country subsample.20 A quick look at the 
amounts multinational corporations actually invest in developing countries reveals that FDI inflows of 
that magnitude are not uncommon. For example, in 2005 Wal-Mart planned to open 70 new units in 
Mexico with an expected investment of 736 million dollars21 and in 1995 Pepsi announced a 55 
million dollar investment in a snack-food company in South Africa,22 Boeing McDonnell Douglas 
invested 31 million dollars in the Czech Republic in 1998.23 
 
It is reasonable to expect that some time is needed before the full effect of targeting materializes. 
Therefore, Table 9 also includes specifications with the targeted variable lagged by one, two or three 
periods. Another, already mentioned, positive aspect of using lagged values is that they attenuate 
potential concerns about endogeneity. We find positive and significant effects of lagged targeting in 
all specifications estimated, both in the full sample and for developing countries. Lagging appears to 
make the results stronger.   
 
                                                     
20 The median value of 11 million dollars pertains to those country-sector combinations, included in the regression presented 
in column 5 in Table 9, which received a positive amount of US FDI in 2004. The figure of 155% is based on the estimate 
reported in the same column. 
21 http://walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=379  
22 http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CE0DF1430F931A15755C0A963958260  
23 http://www.factbook.net/countryreports/cz/cz_fdi_us.htm  
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To investigate the possibility that our results are driven by reverse causality–that is investment inflows 
determine subsequent targeting rather the other way around–in Table 10 we include a dummy variable 
taking the value of one for targeted sectors in the years before targeting started and zero otherwise. In 
different specifications, we consider one year before the start of targeting (column 1 and 5), two years 
(2 and 6), three years (3 and 7) and four years (4 and 8).24 A positive and significant coefficient on the 
dummy would indicate that sectors receiving higher FDI inflows were the ones subsequently chosen 
for targeting. In other words, it would indicate that the investment promotion agencies were picking 
successful sectors as their priority sectors and thus our earlier findings would reflect this selection 
process rather than the effectiveness of investment promotion activities. However, the results 
presented in Table 10 suggest that this was not the case in the developing country subsample. In none 
of the four specifications, does the dummy appear to be statistically significant. The coefficients on the 
targeting variable remain positive and significant. The F-test included in the two lower rows of the 
table suggests that there is a statistically significant difference between the dummy and the targeting 
variable. In contrast, in the full sample, the two effects are not different from each other and the 
targeting variable is not statistically significant. 
 
In Table 11, we present the results from a probit regression modeling the determinants of sector 
targeting. The dependent variable is equal to one if country c begins targeting industry i at time t, and 
zero if the industry is not targeted at time t.25 The purpose of the exercise is to find out whether past 
FDI inflows or FDI stocks in industry i in country c (lagged one, two or three periods) can predict 
future targeting of the industry. The model also includes controls for country characteristics as well as 
country and year fixed effects.26 In only one of twelve specifications, we find a significant coefficient 
on the FDI variable. The coefficient bears a negative sign which suggests that, if anything, developing 
countries chose for targeting sectors with lower FDI flows.  
 
As another robustness check, we remove from the sample observations for targeted sectors in 
countries where the investment promotion agencies reported in the Census that the choice of priority 
sectors was based on the earlier success in attracting inflows to those sectors or the lack thereof. As 
seen in Table 12, removing these countries leads to a stronger rather than weaker effect of the 
investment promotion efforts. 
                                                     
24 Thus, for instance, if country c decided to target sector i in year 2000, the dummy will take on the value of one in 1999 
(columns 1 and 5), in 1998 and 1999 (columns 2 and 6), etc., and zero in all other years. 
25 Thus observations for targeted sectors in years other than the first year of targeting are not included in the sample. 
26 See table note for the list of control variables. 
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4.2. Sector-level analysis – additional robustness checks 
A potential concern is that our findings could be driven by simultaneous opening to FDI and targeting 
of services industries where entry of foreign investors was restricted in the past. To eliminate this 
possibility, we exclude from the sample services sectors and utilities and show that this change does 
not affect our findings (see Table 13).  
 
As agglomeration effects may be important in attracting FDI, we include the lagged FDI stock in the 
sector in Table 14. This additional control variable is not statistically significant and its inclusion does 
not affect our results.    
 
To address the concern that FDI flows may be a poor reflection of actual activities of foreign 
investors, as suggested by Lipsey (2007), we demonstrate that our results hold if we use sales or 
employment of US affiliates abroad as our dependent variable. To save space, we present only results 
for the developing country subsample. When sales are used, the magnitude of the effect is very similar 
to that found in the baseline specification. When employment figures are considered, the size of the 
effect halves (see Table 15). 
 
The choice of the control group is an important consideration. In our analysis, we have compared 
targeted sectors before and after targeting with sectors that were not targeted. A potential concern is 
that inclusion of a large number of low performing (in terms of FDI inflows) sectors could amplify the 
effect of targeting and thus exaggerate its effect. To evaluate this concern we estimate the effect of 
targeting on the subsample of 56 countries that targeted at least one sector during the period covered 
by our analysis (for the list see Table 3). These results are not shown, but the estimated coefficient on 
the targeting variable is positive and significant at the 1% or 5% level for the subsample of developing 
countries.27  
 
In sum, our results suggest that investment promotion efforts are associated with higher FDI inflows to 
targeted sectors in developing countries. The results are robust to a large number of specifications, and 
the available evidence suggests that they are unlikely to suffer from reverse causality problems. The 
findings for the combined sample of developing and developed countries are less clear. Therefore, we 
                                                     
27 More specifically, we estimated the baseline specifications from Table 9 on the sample of 56 countries which gave us 
detailed timing information. The coefficient on the targeting variable in the developing country subsample varied between 
0.767 and 1.244. 
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are hesitant to comment on the effectiveness of investment promotion efforts in a developed country 
context.28 
4.3. Country-level analysis 
The next part of our analysis focuses on aggregate FDI flows and examines whether the existence of 
an investment promotion agency affects the amount of investment received by all sectors in a given 
country. There are several reasons for extending the analysis to the aggregate level. First, the 
information on sector targeting could be plagued by measurement errors. Employing an alternative 
measure of investment promotion activities reduces the possibility that the results are affected by 
measurement error, as obtaining information on the year of IPA establishment is more straightforward 
than cataloguing targeting information. The second reason for looking at aggregate data is that 
aggregate FDI figures are available for a longer time span (we go back to the year 1972 as opposed to 
1990 in the case of sector-level information). Similarly, we can consider a larger number of countries 
than in the sector-level analysis where we are forced to discard countries with incomplete targeting 
information. Third, the detailed information on the status and reporting structure of the agencies 
obtained in the Census allows us to focus on more nuanced questions and thus can give us more 
confidence that we are picking up the IPA effect. 
 
The aggregate analysis confirms the finding of the sector-level analysis. In Table 16, we start with a 
specification with host-country fixed effects, time fixed effects and control variables. The variable of 
interest is a dummy taking on the value of one if a host country has an IPA at time t and zero 
otherwise. As before, we find that developing countries engaged in investment promotion receive 
about two and a half times higher FDI inflows than developing countries not having an IPA. The 
estimated coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level and are very much in line with the 
estimates based on the sector-level data. When developed countries are included in the sample, we 
find a positive effect when the IPA variable is lagged one and two periods but not in the other two 
specifications, which again mirrors our overall conclusions from the previous section. An alternative 
specification where investment promotion efforts are measured by the number of years an IPA has 
been in existence (and its square) leads to the same conclusions. 
 
The estimated effects of the control variables broadly conform to our expectations. We find that 
countries experiencing faster GDP growth tend to attract more FDI. The expected sign on the per 
capita GDP is ambiguous, since this variable can be seen as a measure of the purchasing power of 
                                                     
28 When we focus on the subsample of developed countries we fail to detect any positive effect of investment promotion. 
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local consumers (thus implying a positive relationship for market seeking FDI) or a proxy for labor 
costs (thus implying a negative relationship for efficiency seeking FDI). The estimated negative 
effects might indicate that the latter effect dominates. Population size could be viewed as a proxy for 
the potential market size of the host country. The fact that we find a negative effect is somewhat 
surprising and can perhaps be explained by the inclusion of country fixed effects which capture the 
average country size over the period. Even though the population size tends to change little over time, 
significant changes are likely to take place during the 30-year period covered by our study. As 
population growth tends to decrease with economic development, the negative sign could be a 
reflection of high population growth being correlated with poor performance in other areas of 
economic performance. As anticipated, we find that countries experiencing macroeconomic instability 
(as proxied by high inflation) receive less FDI. Restrictions on civil liberties do not appear to matter in 
the developing country subsample and enter with a negative sign in the full sample. 
 
In Table 17, we test the robustness of our results to the inclusion of proxies for political risk, 
restrictions on political rights and general measures of openness. We lag the openness measures two 
periods to reduce the problem of simultaneity. We find that this extension has little effect on our 
earlier findings. As expected, we find that higher political risk reduces the magnitude of FDI inflows.29 
Restrictions on political rights do not appear to matter, while openness to trade is associated with 
lower inflows of FDI. As these additional controls severely reduce our sample size, we do not include 
them in subsequent estimations. 
 
A typical challenge presented by this type of regressions is separating the effect of the variable of 
interest, investment promotion efforts in our case, from the effects of other economic, political or 
regulatory changes happening at the same time. Therefore, to gain more confidence in our results, we 
examine whether there is a positive relationship between gross fixed domestic capital formation and 
the existence of an IPA. As the mandate of a typical IPA is restricted to promoting investment flows 
from abroad, there is no reason for a positive relationship between the IPA dummy and domestic 
investment. If a positive relationship were found, it would suggest that the IPA dummy may be 
capturing some policy reforms beneficial for investments in general rather than efforts to attract FDI.  
 
The results, presented in Table 18, indicate the absence of such a relationship and thus give us 
confidence that the IPA variable indeed reflects investment promotion activities. In all eight 
regressions, the coefficient on the IPA dummy (contemporaneous or lagged by one or more periods) is 
                                                     
29 Recall that higher values of the index correspond to lower risk, hence the expected positive sign. 
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negative and not statistically significant. In the four columns to the right we add contemporaneous or 
lagged (by one or more periods) FDI inflows as additional control variable.  The coefficient on FDI 
inflows is positive and statistically significant in all regressions. The results (not shown) are almost 
identical when we consider gross domestic capital formation rather than gross fixed domestic capital 
formation as the dependent variable. 
 
Next we turn to the instrumental variable approach in an attempt to address the potential endogeneity 
between past FDI flows and creation of an investment promotion agency. We use a linear probability 
model to predict existence of an IPA. Our first instrument is the existence of an export promotion 
agency in the host country. The rationale is that countries often decide to establish an investment 
promotion agency and an export promotion agency around the same time. To be a valid instrument, 
the establishment of the EPA should explain the establishment of the investment promotion agency, 
without having any direct effect on FDI inflows. As EPAs typically focus on increasing the exports of 
domestic firms, it is not likely that presence of an EPA could directly affect FDI inflows.  
To justify our second instrument we use the fact that bilateral and multilateral donors (e.g., the World 
Bank Group, and in particular its Foreign Investment Advisory Services and the Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency) have been actively engaged in assisting developing countries in setting 
up investment promotion agencies. The involvement of donors in supporting IPAs has been 
significant. As shown in Figure 4, in 2004 donors contributed on average 8 percent of the IPA budget 
in developing countries. Donor involvement went beyond financing and included technical advice, 
staff training, etc. Thus our second instrument is defined as the log of aid received by the host country 
at time t either in dollar terms or in dollars per capita. 
 
As is evident from Table 19, our instruments have a satisfactory predictive power as reflected in the 
high F statistic. We find a positive correlation between the existence of an IPA and an EPA and a 
positive association between the amount of per capita aid received and IPA existence. The Sargan test 
does not reject the validity of the instruments. The results from the second stage confirm our earlier 
findings: the coefficient on the IPA variable is still positive and highly significant in all specifications. 
Some caution is, however, appropriate here given the much larger size of the estimated coefficients 
when compared to the OLS results. Optimistically interpreted, this could be an indication of reverse 
causality: IPAs are more likely to be established in countries with low FDI inflows. OLS estimation 
fails to take this into account and thus underestimates the magnitude of the effects. Pessimistically 
interpreted, the increase in the coefficients in the IV estimations could indicate that the exclusion 
restrictions are not fulfilled and that the instruments affect FDI inflows directly. Given the challenge 
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of finding truly exogenous instruments in a panel of countries, we do not want to overemphasize the 
instrumental variable results.30 
4.4. Agency characteristics 
In response to the difficulties in teasing out the true effect of investment promotion, we next turn to 
asking questions about the effectiveness of different agency structures. We believe that finding 
patterns consistent with the case study evidence collected by investment promotion professionals and 
conventional wisdom will give us more faith in the results we have found so far.  
 
The first question we analyze is whether the agency’s legal status affects its performance. According 
to the case study work by Wells and Wint (2000), the nature of investment promotion activities 
suggests that quasi-governmental agencies may be best positioned to fulfill this function. On the one 
hand, there are several reasons why investment promotion should be performed by governments. First, 
the results of investment promotion activities may be difficult to translate into direct profits. While 
there is a market for consulting firms assisting companies in finding potential investment destinations, 
image building activities cannot be translated into profits that are readily captured by private 
companies. Second, agencies linked to the government may find it easier to assist investors in getting 
regulatory approvals, channel their complaints to the government and lobby authorities on behalf of 
foreign companies. On the other hand, the key ingredients of investment promotion—marketing a 
country as an attractive FDI location and investor servicing—are closer in nature to activities that are 
better performed by the private sector. Successful marketing requires the flexibility to respond to 
changing business conditions and investor needs, calls for close interactions with the private sector 
and relies on the ability to generate and implement consistent promotional strategies throughout a long 
period of time. Usually, government entities are neither flexible nor immune to political interference 
from changing governments. Investor servicing also requires a good understanding of the needs of the 
private sector. Other private sector advantages in investment promotion include cost containment, 
flexibility in hiring and firing and ability to pay salaries above the civil service levels which allows the 
agency to hire highly skilled and motivated staff. 
 
                                                     
30 To further investigate the possible endogeneity of IPA establishment to FDI inflows we also estimated several probit 
models. The dependent variable was equal to one if an IPA was established in country c at time t, and zero if there was no 
IPA in country c at time t. On the right hand side, we included the log of FDI inflows as well as the other controls from Table 
16. Neither contemporary FDI inflows nor their first, second or third lags appeared to be statistically significant in any of the 
specifications. As the IFS database contains very few observations on FDI stocks, we did not repeat the exercise with FDI 
stocks as an explanatory variable. 
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Our results confirm the intuition of Wells and Wint. In regressions not reported here, we find that 
agencies with a more autonomous status (i.e. agencies which are not subunits of a ministry) are more 
effective in attracting FDI inflows than subunits of a ministry.31 In Table 20 (the first two columns), 
we show that this pattern is confirmed when we consider cases of the status change. We find that 
agencies starting out as subunits of a ministry become more effective when they gain more autonomy 
(that is they change their status to being either an autonomous public body, semi-autonomous agency 
reporting to a ministry, joint public-private or private entity), compared to those that remain subunits 
of a ministry.  
 
In a related exercise (also Table 20), we find that IPAs accountable to external entities (in addition to 
or instead of being accountable to the agency’s board) tend to be more effective. Further, we find that 
agencies accountable to entities dealing with economic issues rather than political issues (ministry of 
finance versus ministry of foreign affairs for example) are more effective in attracting FDI.32 An 
explanation for this result might be that the work of an IPA is of economic nature and its involvement 
in the design of economic policy might make the IPA more effective in its mission.  
4.5. Investment incentives 
An aspect of investment promotion that typically receives high levels of attention from both policy 
makers and academics is investment incentives. In the Census, we collected time-varying information 
on five different types of investment incentives: financial incentives, tax holidays, reduced tax rates, 
subsidized infrastructure or services, and regulatory concessions. Our finding is that it is in general 
difficult to distinguish the effect of incentives from a more general effect of investment promotion, as 
there is a high correlation between these variables (see Table 8). When both the existence of 
investment promotion agency and incentives are included simultaneously, we generally find that the 
investment promotion dummy is significant while the incentive variable is not, as can be seen in Table 
21. When the investment promotion variable is excluded, as in Table 22, we find a statistically 
significant positive correlation between FDI inflows and tax incentives and between FDI inflows and 
subsidized infrastructure or services. The magnitude is about the same as what we have typically 
found for the IPA existence effect in the earlier specifications.  
                                                     
31 We define “more autonomous” as having a status other than a subunit of a ministry.  In the Census, 30 IPAs had the status 
of a sub-unit of ministry, 26 an autonomous public body, 43 a semi-autonomous agency reporting to a ministry, 3 a joint 
public-private entity and 2 a private entity (figures for 2004).    
32 We defined economic institutions as ministry of finance, ministry of industry, ministry of commerce or related institutions. 
The group of political institutions consists of president, prime minister and ministry foreign affairs.  
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4.6. Competition between countries 
Government officials are often concerned about growing competition for FDI among countries. To 
shed some light on this issue we extend our specification to include presence of IPAs and FDI 
incentives in a peer group of host countries. In other words, in each year we count the number of 
countries in the peer group with an existing IPA and with FDI incentives on offer.33 In Table 23, the 
peer group refers to countries within the same geographic region, while in Table 24 to countries within 
the same income group.34 We control for the average GDP growth in the peer group (weighted by each 
country’s GDP).  
 
Two interesting findings emerge. First, FDI incentives appear to divert FDI inflows, but only within 
the geographic region, not within the income group. FDI competition taking place within a geographic 
region is consistent with the anecdotal evidence cited earlier. Second, the presence of agencies in the 
peer group does not divert FDI inflows.   
 
Why don’t we find that the presence of IPAs in the peer group leads to diversion of FDI? Presence of 
IPAs in neighboring countries might have three effects. First, positive externalities could exist from 
the marketing and information provision of IPAs in neighboring countries. For instance, CzechInvest’s 
work may induce potential investors to consider not just the Czech Republic but also other countries in 
the region (e.g., neighboring Slovakia). Second, CzechInvest’s marketing and hand-holding might 
convince an investor already considering the region to go to the Czech Republic rather than to a 
neighboring country. Third, the provision of investment incentives by the Czech Republic could 
influence an investor to choose the Czech Republic rather than another country in the region. In other 
words, the first factor is expected to have a positive effect on FDI inflows to other countries in the 
region, while the latter two would work in the opposite direction. The expected sign on the coefficient 
of IPA existence in other countries in the region is, therefore, ambiguous. When we do not control for 
FDI incentives offered by the peer group, we do not find a statistically significant coefficient on the 
number of IPAs in the peer group (results not reported to save space). When we explicitly include 
incentives, the effect of incentives is negative as expected. The IPA presence in other countries is still 
insignificant, which is consistent with the first and second effect being present but working in opposite 
directions.  
                                                     
33 To be more precise the variable enters as the log(number of other countries in the group with z + 0.001), where z is an IPA 
or incentive provision in year t.  
34 We use the World Bank classification of geographic regions: Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), East Asia and the 
Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia (SA) and Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA). We also use the World Bank classification of income groups: low income, lower middle income, upper 
middle income, high income. 
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5. Conclusions 
Recent decades have witnessed an increased competition among countries for FDI inflows. To keep up 
with their peers many countries have engaged in investment promotion efforts and have offered 
incentives to foreign investors. Our analysis, based on newly collected information on  national 
investment promotion efforts offers several insights into these developments. First, our results suggest 
that investment promotion may be a viable policy option for developing countries which wish to 
attract foreign investors. Second, our results confirm the practitioners’ view that agencies’ 
characteristics matter. As expected, subunits of ministries tend to be less effective in attracting FDI 
than agencies with a more autonomous status. Third, our findings on the diverting effect of tax 
incentives offered by other countries in the region point to potential benefits of regional coordination 
in this area. 
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Tables: Information about the data used 
 
Table 1: Aggregation across sectors and time, and matching Census sectors with BEA data 
Sector Targeted sectors matched BEA-data Aggregated Time period in BEA-data 
Petroleum Mining and Quarrying Petroleum  1989-1998 
  Mining  1999-2004 
     
Utilities Electricity, gas and water provision Utilities  1999-2004 
     
Food  
 
Food products Food and kindred products   
 
 1989-1998 
  Food  1999-2004 
     
Chemicals   Petroleum, chemical, rubber, plastic 
products 
Chemicals and allied products    1989-1998 
  Chemicals  1999-2004 
     
Metals Metal and metal products Primary and fabricated metals  1989-2004 
     
Machinery Machinery;  Computers and electronic 
equipment 
Industrial machinery and equipment  1989-1998 
  Machinery Yes 1999-2004 
  Computer and electronic products Yes 1999-2004 
     
Electrical 
equipment 
Computers and electronic equipment Electronic and other electric equipment  1989-1998 
  Electrical equipment, appliances, and components  1999-2004 
     
Transportation 
equipment   
Vehicles and other transport equipment Transportation equipment    1989-2004 
     
Wholesale 
trade 
Trade and repairs Wholesale trade  1989-2004 
     
Banking Financial intermediation; Back office 
services 
Banking  1989-1998 
  Depository institutions  1999-2004 
     
Other Finance Financial intermediation; Real estate 
and business activities; Back office 
services 
Finance (except banking), insurance and real estate  1989-1998 
  Finance (except depository institutions) and insurance  1999-2004 
     
Services Hotels and restaurants (until 1998); 
Real estate and business activities; 
Software; Biotechnology; Back office 
services 
Services  1989-1998 
     
ICT Transport and telecommunications 
(from 1999); Real estate and business 
activities; Software; Back office 
services 
Information  1999-2004 
     
Professional 
services 
Software; Biotechnology Professional, scientific, and technical services  1999-2004 
     
Other industries Agriculture, Fishing and Forestry; 
Textiles and apparel;  Wood and wood 
products;  Construction;  Hotels and 
restaurants (from 1999);  Transport and 
telecommunications (until 1998) 
  
Other industries Yes 1989-2004 
  Other manufacturing Yes 1989-1998 
Note: Aggregated means that we have combined the sectors into one.  
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Table 3: Number of sectors targeted by countries engaged in targeting 
No   Sectors targeted   No   Sectors targeted 
1 Albania  2  29 Kazakhstan  6 
2 Armenia  5  30 Latvia  4 
3 Aruba  2  31 Lebanon  8 
4 Australia  13  32 Lithuania  9 
5 Bosnia and Herzegovina  6  33 Madagascar  14 
6 Botswana  3  34 Mauritania  8 
7 Bulgaria  8  35 Mauritius  8 
8 Cambodia  10  36 Mexico  2 
9 Canada  7  37 Mozambique  4 
10 Chile  8  38 Netherlands  3 
11 Congo, Dem. Rep. 4  39 Netherlands Antilles  3 
12 Costa Rica  8  40 New Zealand  10 
13 Côte d'Ivoire  10  41 Nicaragua  6 
14 Cyprus  4  42 Oman  7 
15 Czech Republic  7  43 Panama  2 
16 Ecuador  3  44 Peru  3 
17 El Salvador  10  45 Portugal  11 
18 Fiji  4  46 Samoa  2 
19 Finland  5  47 Senegal  5 
20 France  4  48 Serbia and Montenegro 5 
21 Ghana  7  49 Slovenia  10 
22 Greece  10  50 South Africa  11 
23 Guatemala  5  51 St. Vincent and the Grenadines  4 
24 Guinea  8  52 Sweden  11 
25 Hungary  4  53 Tunisia  6 
26 Iceland  4  54 Uganda  12 
27 Jamaica  1  55 Vanuatu  8 
28 Jordan  10   56 Venezuela, RB 6 
Note: Tables gives maximum number of sectors targeted by a country within one year. Sample corresponds to 
column 1, Table 9. 
 
 
Table 4: Sectors included in the sector-level analysis 
Sector  Number of observations  
Petroleum  1,370 
Utilities  526 
Food  1,353 
Chemicals  1,430 
Metals  1,435 
Machinery  1,389 
Electrical equipment  1,449 
Transportation equipment  1,429 
Wholesale trade  1,612 
Banking  1,186 
Other Finance  1,356 
Services  473 
ICT  445 
Professional services  491 
Other industries  1,252 
Total 17,196 
 35
Note: The number of observations corresponds to the regression of column 1, Table 9.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics corresponding to benchmark table, sector-level analysis 
 All countries    Developing countries   
  No. of observations Mean Std. dev.  No. of observations Mean Std. dev.
FDI inflow (million current US dollars) 17196 49.20 791.00  13012 10.50 170.00
L.FDI stock (million current US dollars) 17193 471.00 3120.00  13012 102.00 545.00
Sector targeting dummy 17196 0.10 0.30  13012 0.10 0.30
1 year before sect. targ. 17196 0.02 0.14  13012 0.02 0.14
1 and 2 years before sect. targ. 17196 0.04 0.20  13012 0.04 0.20
1, 2 and 3 years before sect. targ. 17196 0.06 0.24  13012 0.06 0.24
1, 2, 3 and 4 years before sect. targ. 17196 0.07 0.27  13012 0.08 0.27
Note: The period is 1990-2004. L means lagged one period.  
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics corresponding to table using sales 
and employment and the dependent variable, sector-level analysis 
 No. of. obs. Mean Std. dev. 
Developing, sales       
Sales (million current US dollars) 3087 1040.00 2470.00 
Sector targeting dummy 3087 0.05 0.22 
    
Developing, employment       
Employment 3360 7092.46 18198.19 
Sector targeting dummy 3360 0.06 0.23 
Note: The period covered is 1983-2003.  
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics aggregate analysis 
 All countries    Developing countries  
  No. of observations Mean Std. dev.  No. of observations Mean Std. dev. 
FDI flow (millions current US dollars) 2644 2050.00 7090.00  1876 918.00 4290.00
IPA 2644 0.43 0.49  1876 0.42 0.49
GDP growth (based on GDP in constant 2000 US dollars) 2644 0.03 0.05  1876 0.03 0.05
Inflation 2644 0.40 3.50  1876 0.53 4.14
GDP per capita  (current US dollars) 2644 5680.00 8230.00  1876 1794.93 1958.76
Population (millions) 2644 26.80 102.00  1876 29.90 119.00
Restrictions on civil liberties 2644 3.31 1.79  1876 3.90 1.56
Restrictions on political rights 2644 3.15 2.07  1876 3.77 1.95
Political risk (ICRG) 1658 65.32 15.76  1143 58.77 12.87
L2.Exports+Imports  (millions constant 2000 US dollars) 2231 60500.00 125000.00  1627 21300.00 51500.00
L2.(Exports+Imports)/GDP (GDP in constant 2000 US dollars) 2231 0.66 0.42  1627 0.71 0.46
Gross fixed capital formation  (millions constant 2000 US dollars) 2146 38800.00 127000.00  1562 13400.00 42500.00
EPA (existence of an export agency) 1618 0.52 0.50  1125 0.48 0.50
Aid (million current US dollars) 2030 298.00 457.00  1844 308.00 457.00
Aid per capita  (current US dollars) 2030 49.86 68.27  1844 48.84 64.91
Time varying dummy agency status: subunit of ministry 2274 0.16 0.37  1561 0.12 0.32
Time varying dummy agency status: quasi autonomous public body 2274 0.28 0.45  1561 0.32 0.47
Time varying dummy agency status: other 2274 0.05 0.22  1561 0.07 0.26
Status change: from subunit of ministry 2644 0.01 0.08  1876 0.01 0.09
Accountable to external entity 2374 0.32 0.47  1702 0.31 0.46
Accountable to economic entity 2374 0.29 0.45  1702 0.28 0.45
Accountable to political entity 2374 0.03 0.18  1702 0.03 0.18
Accountable to agency board 2374 0.04 0.20  1702 0.06 0.23
Voice and Accountability 2621 0.21 0.92  1853 -0.13 0.77
Political Stability 2621 0.04 0.90  1853 -0.28 0.80
Government Effectiveness 2621 0.26 1.03  1853 -0.28 0.60
Regulatory Quality 2621 0.26 0.85  1853 -0.14 0.63
Rule of Law 2621 0.19 1.02  1853 -0.35 0.62
Control of Corruption 2621 0.25 1.09  1853 -0.34 0.57
Average of all KKZ 2621 0.20 0.91  1853 -0.25 0.59
Financial incentives 2351 0.05 0.22  1705 0.04 0.20
Tax holidays 2327 0.15 0.35  1581 0.18 0.39
Reduced tax rates 2099 0.12 0.32  1411 0.13 0.33
Tax hol. or red. tax rates 2383 0.17 0.38  1637 0.21 0.40
Subsidized infras. or serv. 2353 0.02 0.15  1615 0.03 0.18
Regulatory concessions 2488 0.01 0.08  1720 0.01 0.10
Fin. or tax inc. 2550 0.18 0.39  1782 0.21 0.41
Fin. or tax inc. or subs. 2563 0.18 0.38  1795 0.21 0.41
IPAs, region level 2644 7.56 4.92  1876 6.89 4.71
Tax hol. or red. tax rates, region level 2383 3.08 2.83  1637 3.46 3.17
Fin. or tax inc., region level 2550 3.28 3.10  1782 3.67 3.46
Fin. or tax inc. or subs., region level 2563 3.30 3.13  1795 3.70 3.50
IPAs, income gr. level 2644 10.72 6.55  1876 10.91 6.87
Tax hol. or red. tax rates, income gr. level 2383 4.57 4.52  1637 5.64 5.00
Fin. or tax inc., income gr. level 2550 4.94 4.63  1782 5.98 5.03
Fin. or tax inc. or subs., income gr. level 2563 4.96 4.64  1795 6.01 5.04
GDP growth, region (based on GDP in constant 2000 US dollars) 2644 0.03 0.02  1876 0.03 0.03
GDP growth, income gr. (based on GDP in constant 2000 US dollars) 2644 0.04 0.02  1876 0.04 0.02
Note: The sample corresponds to columns 1 and 5, Table 16. Quasi autonomous public body means Autonomous public body or Semi-autonomous 
agency reporting to a ministry. Rest means Joint public-private entity or Private or Other. The period covered is 1972-2004. LX means lagged X periods. 
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Table 8: Correlation between IPA existence and incentives 
 IPA Financial Tax holidays Tax reductions Tax hol. or red. Subsidies Regulations Other Fin, tax or sub. Fin or tax. 
IPA 1.00          
Financial 0.28 1.00         
Tax holidays 0.44 0.34 1.00        
Tax reductions  0.48 0.30 0.61 1.00       
Tax hol. or red.  0.50 0.34 0.92 0.76 1.00      
Subsidies 0.14 0.07 0.38 0.18 0.36 1.00     
Regulations 0.18 0.27 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.01 1.00    
Other 0.15 0.07 0.39 0.28 0.38 0.43 0.17 1.00   
Fin, tax or sub. 0.53 0.45 0.89 0.74 0.97 0.35 0.24 0.363 1.00  
Fin or tax. 0.53 0.45 0.89 0.74 0.97 0.35 0.24 0.363 1.00 1.00 
Note: “Subsidies” refers to subsidized infrastructure or services, “Regulations” to regulatory concessions, “Fin, tax or sub.” to offering financial 
incentives, tax holidays, tax reductions or subsidies to infrastructure/services, “Fin or tax” to offering financial incentives, tax reductions or tax holidays.  
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Tables: Sector-level analysis 
 
 
Table 9: Baseline specification with country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing 
Sector targeting 0.308    0.935***    
 [0.341]    [0.330]    
L. Sector targeting  0.770**    1.159***   
  [0.362]    [0.346]   
L2. Sector targeting   1.033**    1.377***  
   [0.406]    [0.387]  
L3. Sector targeting    0.968**    1.360*** 
    [0.457]    [0.430] 
Observations 17196 17193 16610 16009 13012 13012 12522 12017 
No. of country-sector groups 1570 1570 1570 1568 1203 1203 1203 1201 
Within R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time 
t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. 
 
 
Table 10: Controlling for FDI inflows before targeting. Specification with country-year, sector-year 
and country-sector fixed effects 
 All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing
Sector targeting 0.227 0.307 0.143 0.230 0.920*** 1.052*** 0.770** 0.864**
 [0.354] [0.367] [0.381] [0.395] [0.343] [0.355] [0.369] [0.384]
1 year before sect. targ. -0.404 -0.073   
 [0.460] [0.437]   
1 and 2 years before sect. targ.  -0.004 0.311  
  [0.365] [0.347]  
1, 2 and 3 years before sect. targ.  -0.330  -0.322 
  [0.337]  [0.322] 
1, 2, 3 and 4 years before sect. targ.  -0.130   -0.113
      [0.329]      [0.314]
Observations 17196 17196 17196 17196 13012 13012 13012 13012
No. of country-sector groups 1570 1570 1570 1570 1203 1203 1203 1203
Within R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Test coeff F 1.58 0.57 1.54 0.97 4.30 3.52 8.91 7.76
Test coeff p 0.21 0.45 0.21 0.32 0.04 0.06 0.00 0.01
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time 
t, and zero otherwise. “X year before sect. targ.” is a dummy variable equal to one in the X years before targeting started in a particular sector, and zero 
otherwise. “F” and “p-value” is the F-statistics and the p-value of a test if the coefficient of the dummy before targeting started is different from the 
coefficient of the targeting dummy.  
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Table 11: Explaining the choice of sectors to be targeted. Probit specification 
  All All All Developing Developing Developing 
L.FDI flow -0.006   -0.007   
 [0.005]   [0.006]   
L2.FDI flow  0.000   -0.001  
  [0.005]   [0.007]  
L3.FDI flow   -0.008   -0.014** 
   [0.005]   [0.007] 
Observations 4274 4079 3842 3272 3111 2904 
L.FDI stock 0.001   0.001   
 [0.005]   [0.006]   
L2.FDI stock  0.005   0.006  
  [0.005]   [0.006]  
L3.FDI stock   0.005   0.007 
   [0.006]   [0.006] 
Observations 4914 4295 4097 3790 3293 3129 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is equal to 
one if country c begins targeting industry i at time t, and zero if the industry is not targeted at time t. LX means lagged X periods. Other controls include 
GDP per capita, population size, GDP growth, inflation, restrictions on civil liberties, country and year fixed effects. Population, GDP per capita, FDI 
flow and FDI stock enter in the log form. 
 
Table 12: Removing cases of targeting determined by previous success or failure in attracting FDI to 
the sector. Specification with country-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing
Sector targeting 0.866* 1.511***   
 [0.488] [0.472]   
L. Sector targeting  1.373*** 1.821***  
  [0.514] [0.489]  
L2. Sector targeting  1.166**  1.654*** 
  [0.564]  [0.534] 
L3. Sector targeting  0.839   0.824
      [0.640]      [0.595]
Observations 15285 15282 14750 14204 11699 11699 11246 10782
No. of country-sector groups 1389 1389 1389 1387 1075 1075 1075 1073
Within R-squared 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
 Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log 
of inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at 
time t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods.  
 
Table 13: Removing services sectors and utilities. Specification with country-year, sector-year and 
country-sector fixed effects 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing
Sector targeting 0.590 1.406***   
 [0.438] [0.420]   
L. Sector targeting  0.801* 1.457***  
  [0.467] [0.446]  
L2. Sector targeting  0.838  1.359*** 
  [0.515]  [0.487] 
L3. Sector targeting  0.615   1.329**
      [0.573]      [0.535]
Observations 11107 11104 10894 10678 8400 8400 8217 8028
No. of country-sector groups 868 868 868 868 665 665 665 665
Within R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time t, 
and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. 
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Table 14: Controlling for lagged FDI stock in the sector. Specification with country-year, sector-year 
and country-sector fixed effects 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing 
Sector targeting 0.313    0.936***    
 [0.341]    [0.330]    
L. Sector targeting  0.770**    1.160***   
  [0.362]    [0.346]   
L2. Sector targeting   1.032**    1.377***  
   [0.406]    [0.387]  
L3. Sector targeting    0.965**    1.360*** 
    [0.457]    [0.430] 
         
L. FDI stock 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.011 0.006 0.006 0.002 -0.004 
  [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.014] [0.015] 
Observations 17193 17193 16610 16009 13012 13012 12522 12017 
No. of country-sector groups 1570 1570 1570 1568 1203 1203 1203 1201 
Within R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time 
t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. FDI stock is included in the log form. 
 
Table 15: Using US affiliate sales and employment as dependent variables. Specification with coun-
try-year, sector-year and country-sector fixed effects 
  US affiliate sales US affiliate employment 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing
Sector targeting 1.033*** 0.520***   
 [0.363] [0.143]   
L. Sector targeting  1.096*** 0.483***  
  [0.402] [0.158]  
L2. Sector targeting  1.054**  0.505*** 
  [0.452]  [0.186] 
L3. Sector targeting  1.164**   0.507**
  [0.534]   [0.223]
             
Observations 3087 3034 2976 2917 3360 3295 3227 3159
No. of country-sector groups 227 226 225 225 233 233 233 233
Within R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of US foreign direct investment into industry i in country c at time t. Sector targeting is equal to one if industry i was targeted by country c at time 
t, and zero otherwise. LX means lagged X periods. 
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Tables: Country-level analysis 
Table 16: Specification with country and time fixed effects 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing 
IPA 0.640    1.337***    
 [0.393]    [0.481]    
L. IPA  1.036***    1.646***   
  [0.398]    [0.485]   
L2. IPA   0.822**    1.353***  
   [0.403]    [0.489]  
Age    0.489    1.333*** 
    [0.405]    [0.507] 
Age squared    0.006    -0.253 
    [0.152]    [0.195] 
GDP per capita -1.651*** -1.633*** -1.644*** -1.696*** -2.243*** -2.250*** -2.234*** -2.231*** 
 [0.431] [0.431] [0.431] [0.438] [0.512] [0.512] [0.512] [0.516] 
GDP growth 8.646*** 8.557*** 8.683*** 8.611*** 9.752*** 9.740*** 9.967*** 9.781*** 
 [2.432] [2.430] [2.430] [2.431] [2.744] [2.741] [2.743] [2.744] 
Population -3.267** -3.196** -3.221** -3.261** -8.684*** -8.596*** -8.555*** -8.679*** 
 [1.417] [1.416] [1.417] [1.418] [2.225] [2.222] [2.225] [2.226] 
Inflation -0.089*** -0.090*** -0.090*** -0.091*** -0.081** -0.082** -0.083** -0.082** 
 [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
Restrictions on civil liberties -0.222 -0.233* -0.233* -0.252* -0.183 -0.201 -0.200 -0.209 
  [0.140] [0.140] [0.140] [0.141] [0.157] [0.157] [0.157] [0.159] 
Observations 2644 2644 2644 2644 1876 1876 1876 1876 
No. of countries 114 114 114 114 89 89 89 89 
Within R-squared 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. Age, 
Population and GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free countries to 7 denoting 
least free countries. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. LX means lagged X periods. 
 
Table 17: Specification with country and time fixed effects and additional control variables 
  All All All All Developing Developing Developing Developing 
IPA 0.437 0.458 0.544 0.494 1.386** 1.394** 1.307** 1.280** 
 [0.489] [0.489] [0.505] [0.505] [0.589] [0.589] [0.603] [0.605] 
Restrictions on political rights  -0.296    -0.132   
  [0.215]    [0.230]   
L2. Exports+Imports   -1.464**    -1.279*  
   [0.676]    [0.713]  
L2. (Exports+Imports)/GDP    -1.737***    -1.001 
    [0.641]    [0.684] 
GDP per capita -2.711*** -2.647*** -1.979*** -2.149*** -3.554*** -3.522*** -3.031*** -3.354*** 
 [0.594] [0.596] [0.727] [0.672] [0.663] [0.665] [0.799] [0.743] 
GDP growth 12.574*** 12.527*** 11.241*** 12.942*** 13.359*** 13.325*** 12.154*** 13.734*** 
 [3.682] [3.681] [4.002] [3.916] [3.997] [3.999] [4.247] [4.143] 
Population -10.336*** -9.931*** -7.413*** -6.971** -13.280*** -13.008*** -13.477*** -12.990*** 
 [2.503] [2.519] [2.698] [2.709] [3.383] [3.417] [3.574] [3.685] 
Inflation -0.089** -0.090*** -0.088*** -0.086** -0.075** -0.076** -0.078** -0.076** 
 [0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] 
Restrictions on civil liberties -0.320* -0.084 -0.373* -0.311 -0.219 -0.106 -0.317 -0.296 
 [0.190] [0.256] [0.193] [0.195] [0.200] [0.280] [0.203] [0.205] 
Political risk (ICRG) 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.090*** 0.087*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 
  [0.022] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] 
Observations 1658 1658 1512 1512 1143 1143 1092 1092 
No. of countries 94 94 89 89 69 69 67 67 
Within R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. 
Exports+Imports, Population and GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free 
countries to 7 denoting least free countries. The index of political risk ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 means very high political risk and 100 very low 
political risk. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. LX means lagged X periods.  
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Table 18: The effect of IPA on domestic capital formation 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing
IPA -0.040 -0.041 -0.038 -0.035 -0.036
 [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.027] [0.026]
L. IPA  -0.029   
  [0.028]   
L2. IPA  -0.046   
  [0.028]   
L3. IPA  -0.047   
  [0.029]   
FDI inflows  0.003**   
  [0.001]   
L. FDI inflows  0.004***  
  [0.001]  
L2. FDI inflows   0.003** 
   [0.001] 
L3. FDI inflows    0.003**
    [0.001]
L2. GDP per capita 0.425*** 0.425*** 0.425*** 0.424*** 0.372*** 0.362*** 0.349*** 0.340***
 [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029]
L2. GDP growth 1.491*** 1.494*** 1.504*** 1.500*** 1.509*** 1.496*** 1.478*** 1.588***
 [0.142] [0.142] [0.142] [0.142] [0.152] [0.150] [0.150] [0.158]
L2. Population 0.280** 0.280** 0.276** 0.273** 0.028 0.034 -0.003 -0.041
 [0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.120] [0.130] [0.132] [0.134] [0.135]
L2. Inflation -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
 [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
L2. Restrictions on civil liberties 0.019** 0.020** 0.020** 0.020** 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.004
  [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009] [0.008]
Observations 1753 1753 1753 1753 1523 1524 1507 1477
No. of countries 80 80 80 80 77 77 77 77
Within R-squared 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.53
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
gross fixed capital formation in country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. FDI inflows, 
Population and GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free countries to 7 denoting 
least free countries. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. LX means lagged X periods.  
 
Table 19: Instrumental variable estimation 
First stage Developing Developing Developing 
EPA 0.362*** 0.360*** 0.362*** 
 [0.036] [0.037] [0.037] 
Aid  0.007*  
  [0.004]  
Aid per capita   0.029** 
      [0.014] 
Within R-squared 0.48 0.47 0.47 
Shea partial R2 0.13 0.13 0.13 
F 99.99 48.35 48.98 
    
Second stage       
IPA 7.706*** 7.011*** 7.141*** 
  [1.773] [1.681] [1.676] 
    
Sargan statistics  0.00 0.12 
Sargan P-value  0.99 0.73 
        
Observations 761 743 743 
No. of countries 44 44 44 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The first stage is a linear probability 
model predicting existence of an IPA. The dependent variable in the second stage is the log of inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. 
IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. Control variables both in first and second stage are the usual: log of GDP 
per capita, GDP growth, log of Population, Inflation, Restrictions on civil liberties and Political risk (ICRG). All regressions include host country and 
year fixed effects. The instruments used to predict IPA existence are the existence of an export agency (EPA) in country c at time t, as well as aid and aid 
per capita inflows to country c at time t.  
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Table 20: Agency reporting and status 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing 
IPA 1.584 -2.067 -0.345 1.413** 1.716*** 
 [1.083] [1.553] [1.045] [0.571] [0.571] 
Status change: from subunit of ministry 3.217* 3.971*   
 [1.849] [2.096]   
Accountable to external entity 3.783**   
 [1.602]   
Accountable to economic entity 2.130*   1.815*** 
 [1.110]   [0.594]
Accountable to political entity -0.499  0.966 
 [1.394]  [1.362]
Accountable to agency board  -3.783** -2.069 
  [1.602] [1.553]
GDP per capita -4.374*** -5.795*** -2.216*** -2.320*** -2.292*** -2.216*** -2.246*** 
 [1.307] [1.958] [0.548] [0.549] [0.551] [0.548] [0.551]
GDP growth 10.720 9.396 9.710*** 9.709*** 9.621*** 9.710*** 9.729*** 
 [6.667] [9.211] [2.905] [2.907] [2.910] [2.905] [2.906]
Population -17.375*** -20.098 -6.617*** -6.557*** -6.809*** -6.617*** -6.547*** 
 [4.940] [14.268] [2.403] [2.407] [2.407] [2.403] [2.406]
Inflation 0.307 -0.076 -0.086** -0.086** -0.083** -0.086** -0.087** 
 [0.537] [0.547] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035] [0.035]
Restrictions on civil liberties -0.311 1.004 -0.227 -0.244 -0.233 -0.227 -0.233 
  [0.413] [0.697] [0.174] [0.174] [0.174] [0.174] [0.174]
Observations 327 193 1702 1702 1702 1702 1702 
Number of group(code) 15 15 88 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.25 0.29 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. Population and 
GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free countries to 7 denoting least free 
countries. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. The estimates in the first two columns are based on a sample including counties 
where the IPA either changed its status from being a subunit of a ministry to a more autonomous setup or remained a subunit of a ministry throughout the 
entire period. The model in the first column is estimated on all years available for these countries, while the sample in the second column includes only 
years during an IPA was in operation. Accountable to external entity takes the value of one if either “Accountable to economic entity” takes the value of 
one or the “Accountable to political entity” takes the value of one.         
 44
Table 21: IPA existence and incentives 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing 
IPA 1.122** 0.320 0.763 0.373 1.298** 1.030** 1.082** 1.046** 
 [0.495] [0.536] [0.621] [0.534] [0.528] [0.509] [0.510] [0.506] 
Financial incentives -0.686        
 [0.985]        
Tax holidays  0.777       
  [0.615]       
Reduced tax rates   -0.403      
   [0.815]      
Tax hol. or red. tax rates    0.474     
    [0.597]     
Subsidized infras. or serv.     2.460*    
     [1.392]    
Regulatory concessions      -0.202   
      [2.705]   
Fin. or tax inc.       0.232  
       [0.562]  
Fin. or tax inc. or subs.        0.260 
        [0.558] 
GDP per capita -1.940*** -1.625*** -1.906*** -1.543*** -2.178*** -2.325*** -1.767*** -1.767*** 
 [0.543] [0.592] [0.632] [0.581] [0.574] [0.542] [0.547] [0.545] 
GDP growth 10.420*** 10.580*** 11.517*** 10.519*** 8.948*** 8.878*** 10.110*** 9.296*** 
 [2.864] [3.027] [3.254] [2.976] [3.003] [2.850] [2.886] [2.817] 
Population -7.348*** -2.100 -1.452 -2.410 -4.280* -7.256*** -6.103*** -5.845** 
 [2.333] [2.479] [2.678] [2.445] [2.441] [2.335] [2.307] [2.289] 
Inflation -0.076** -0.077** -0.089** -0.081** -0.082** -0.080** -0.079** -0.080** 
 [0.033] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
Restrictions on civil liberties 0.018 -0.132 -0.093 -0.116 -0.221 -0.081 -0.271* -0.268* 
  [0.166] [0.169] [0.179] [0.166] [0.171] [0.166] [0.162] [0.161] 
Observations 1705 1581 1411 1637 1615 1720 1782 1795 
No. of countries 81 75 70 79 78 83 85 86 
Within R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. Population and 
GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free countries to 7 denoting least free 
countries. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. 
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Table 22: Incentives when IPA existence is excluded 
  Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing Developing 
Financial incentives -0.718        
 [0.992]        
Tax holidays  1.431**       
  [0.594]       
Reduced tax rates   -0.403      
   [0.752]      
Tax hol. or red. tax rates    1.071*     
    [0.571]     
Subsidized infras. or serv.     2.887**    
     [1.395]    
Regulatory concessions      0.102   
      [2.721]   
Fin. or tax inc.       0.997*  
       [0.539]  
Fin. or tax inc. or subs.        1.008* 
        [0.535] 
GDP per capita -2.191*** -1.883*** -2.167*** -1.794*** -2.414*** -2.522*** -1.951*** -1.952*** 
 [0.541] [0.588] [0.627] [0.578] [0.571] [0.540] [0.545] [0.543] 
GDP growth 10.267*** 10.183*** 11.074*** 10.033*** 8.744*** 8.718*** 9.713*** 9.021*** 
 [2.855] [3.005] [3.230] [2.958] [2.990] [2.837] [2.874] [2.805] 
Population -6.385*** -1.266 -0.559 -1.714 -3.327 -6.282*** -5.130** -4.898** 
 [2.341] [2.475] [2.673] [2.446] [2.447] [2.339] [2.310] [2.292] 
Inflation -0.077** -0.076** -0.089** -0.080** -0.083** -0.080** -0.077** -0.078** 
 [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] 
Restrictions on civil liberties 0.078 -0.089 -0.026 -0.065 -0.149 -0.027 -0.214 -0.212 
  [0.167] [0.169] [0.179] [0.166] [0.171] [0.167] [0.163] [0.162] 
Observations 1731 1607 1437 1663 1641 1746 1808 1821 
No. of countries 82 76 71 80 79 84 86 87 
Within R-squared 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the log of 
inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t. Population and 
GDP per capita enter in the log form. The index of restrictions on civil liberties ranges from 1 denoting most free countries to 7 denoting least free 
countries. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. 
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Table 23: Competition within the geographic region 
    Developing Developing Developing 
Host country variables IPA 0.437 1.093** 1.056** 
  [0.538] [0.512] [0.508] 
 Tax hol. or red. tax rates 0.527   
  [0.598]   
 Fin. or tax inc.  0.215  
   [0.563]  
 Fin. or tax inc. or subs.   0.246 
        [0.558] 
Regional variables IPAs, region 0.648 0.785 0.751 
  [0.874] [0.810] [0.806] 
 Tax hol. or red. tax rates, region -0.230**   
  [0.104]   
 Fin. or tax inc., region  -0.291***  
   [0.097]  
 Fin. or tax inc. or subs., region   -0.291*** 
    [0.097] 
 GDP growth, region -6.830 -10.468 -11.160* 
    [7.022] [6.703] [6.642] 
 Observations 1637 1782 1795 
 No. of countries 79 85 86 
 Within R-squared 0.16 0.17 0.17 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent variable is the 
log of inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. Host country variables: IPA equals one if an investment promotion agency exists 
in country c at time t, and zero otherwise. The incentive variables are equal to one if country c provided at least one of the relevant incentives at 
time t, and zero otherwise. Host country control variables (not shown in the table) include: log of GDP per capita, GDP growth, log of Population, 
Inflation, Restrictions on civil liberties. All regressions include host country and year fixed effects. Regional variables: “regions” are defined 
following the World Bank classification: Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia (SA) and Middle East and North Africa (MENA). GDP growth is the GDP weighted average of the 
GDP growth of the other countries in the region (included in the sample). The weights are year specific. Other regional variables include the log of 
the number of other countries in country c’s region that have an IPA or offer one of the incentives in year t.   
 
Table 24: Competition within the income group 
    Developing Developing Developing 
Host country variables IPA 0.364 1.079** 1.043** 
  [0.536] [0.512] [0.508] 
 Tax hol. or red. tax rates 0.489   
  [0.598]   
 Fin. or tax inc.  0.194  
   [0.563]  
 Fin. or tax inc. or subs.   0.223 
        [0.559] 
Income group variables IPAs, inc. gr 0.311 -0.045 -0.051 
  [1.018] [0.976] [0.972] 
 Tax hol. or red. tax rates, income gr. 0.126   
  [0.138]   
 Fin. or tax inc., income group  0.080  
   [0.143]  
 Fin. or tax inc. or sub., income gr.   0.081 
    [0.142] 
 GDP growth, income gr. -15.941 -12.534 -12.539 
    [10.869] [10.453] [10.376] 
 Observations 1637 1782 1795 
 No. of countries 79 85 86 
  Within R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 
Note: Standard errors are reported in brackets. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. The dependent 
variable is the log of inflow of foreign direct investment into country c at time t. Host country variables: IPA equals one if an 
investment promotion agency exists in country c at time t, and zero otherwise. The incentive variables are equal to one if country c 
provided at least one of the relevant incentives at time t, and zero otherwise. Host country control variables (not shown in the table) 
include: log of GDP per capita, GDP growth, log of Population, Inflation, Restrictions on civil liberties. All regressions include host 
country and year fixed effects. Regional variables: “income groups” are defined following the World Bank classification: low income, 
lower middle income, upper middle income. GDP growth is the GDP weighted average of the GDP growth of the other countries in 
the region (included in the sample). The weights are year specific. Other regional variables include the log of the number of other 
countries in country c’s region that have an IPA or offer one of the incentives in year t.   
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Number of IPAs in existence 
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Figure 2: Frequency of targeting by sector 
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Figure 3: US FDI stock versus FDI stock from other OECD countries in year 2000 
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Note: Figure based on bilateral OECD data, FDI stocks in million USD, year 2000. Regional breakdown corresponds to the World 
Bank classification of developing countries: Latin American and the Caribbean (LAC), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Europe 
and Central Asia (ECA), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), South Asia (SA) and Middle East and North Africa (MENA). High income 
countries do not include the US. 
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Figure 4: Donor participation in IPA funding 
